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Introduction 
Ahead of the Bonn summit, held in July 2001 and intending to save the Kyoto Protocol on cli-
mate change, expectations had been high that the problem of increasing global warming could 
be solved by a general decrease of CO2 and other emissions of greenhouse gases to a level be-
low that of 1990, and maybe even further. However, the Bonn summit succeeded only to a mi-
nor extent. Once more, little more than lip service has been paid to the warnings of the scientific 
community. The compromise which has been reached after tough and tiring negotiations is the 
absolute minimum of what has to be undertaken to prevent global warming from going on as 
before. Even so, there is no guarantee that the ecosystem will not capsize and put an end to hu-
manity. Arrogance and narrow-mindedness continue to dominate human decisions. 
The outcomes of the Bonn summit and of the subsequent conference at Marrakech in No-
vember 2001 illustrate the everlasting political dilemma: to find the right balance between what 
is urgently needed and what politicians are prepared to concede. It also demonstrates that the 
ecosystem is still perceived as a bottomless reservoir from which we can scoop an endless quan-
tity of resources, and an equally bottomless sink into which we can dip all our waste – naturally 
everything at zero cost. 
This observation marks the point of departure of this essay: the driving forces behind envi-
ronmental change and environmentally induced mass migration lie with human decisions and 
actions. Based on the subjective perceptions of the reality, they reflect the worldview and the 
underlying value systems of a given society. Solutions towards the mitigation of human-induced 
global warming effects and of environmentally induced migration will therefore have to root in 
a change in attitude of the human race. Everybody is concerned by such a change; politicians 
alone cannot be made responsible for the near-failure in Bonn and Marrakech. As representa-
tives of their countries and populations, however, they bear an enhanced share of responsibility: 
they ought to take the lead in all questions and show new ways ahead. Gouverner c’est prévoir.
As a consequence of the Bonn agreement, the industrialized countries will have to come to 
grips with the problem of greenhouse gas emissions, both technically and morally: “The Proto-
col will enter into force and become legally binding after it has been ratified by at least 55 par-
ties to the Convention, including industrialized countries representing at least 55% of the total 
1990 carbon dioxide emissions from this group. So far, 36 countries have ratified, including one 
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industrialized country (Romania).” (Press release 2001). If this condition can be fulfilled, we 
may speak of a relative success. The chance for the survival of humanity continues to exist, and 
maybe large-scale migration for the reason of global warming need not happen. 
This paper is characterised by a moral undertone and is very critical towards our current 
Western way of thinking. It is therefore not a scientific paper in the narrow sense of the word. In 
particular, it is not concerned with a discussion of the predictability of environmental migrations 
or of potential technical measures. Döös (1997) has discussed the former and shown its limits – 
migrations are to a considerable extent the result of personal decisions, even if external causes 
must not be ignored. As to the latter, humanity has equipped itself with a formidable set of tech-
nological instruments to solve almost every problem, but we have learnt in the course of the 20th
century that most technical solutions carry within themselves new predicaments. We cannot 
foresee the consequences of the application of a particular technology, and we usually tend to 
narrow down the choice of possible solutions to a problem to a single one that is considered the 
only realistic one. We think in a 'monocultural' way and leave no room for alternatives – the 
Indian ecologist Vandana Shiva (1993, p. 5) calls this the "TINA syndrome" (‘There is no alter-
native’). A change in attitude is more pressing than new techniques, and it is precisely at this 
point where the value system has to be discussed. 
Values, world views and thinking 
All processes influenced by Man, diverse as they may be, are ultimately driven by a value sys-
tem. The term of values has itself been subject to widespread discussions, since it is used in a 
variety of disciplines. Habitually, the word first evokes its economic context of use-value, a per-
spective that has influenced our thinking very deeply. The ethical and sociocultural aspects 
(which can be called 'non-use values'; cf. Edwards & Abivardi 1998) come second only, but it is 
from this perspective that the present discussion will be conducted. 
Values can be called general principles legitimating the rules of behaviour set by norms 
(Chazel 1988, p. 125). They lie behind our varying interests and guide our knowledge systems, 
social behaviour, consumption, etc. The bearers of values are the individuals, but every individ-
ual is part of a society to which it transfers his/her values, which, in turn, will become a property 
of the respective society. It is important, however, to stress their subjective character, as certain 
individuals with their personality are able to transmit or even impose their particular value sys-
tem on a group or even an entire society. In such cases, the desire of an individual actor is very 
important relative to the value he/she defends (cf. Livet 2001). 
Values exist as a duality or couple, i.e. they are characterized by fixed terms. From their 
contents, we can imagine them as two extremes lying at either end of a continuum. Becker 
(1959, quoted in Hillmann 1989, p. 141 ff.) uses the two terms of 'sacred' and 'secular' to de-
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scribe comprehensive value systems (Fig. 1). These two terms must not be interpreted as reli-
gious notions in the sense of a particular institutionalised religion, but rather as general spiritual 
terms, referring to specific modes of acting. An individual or a society dominated by sacred val-
ues will experience problems when dealing with innovations, as it tends towards the conserva-
tion of inherited ways of life, whereas a secular society embraces changes and considers them 
indispensable elements of social progress. 
- conservation 
- solidarity 
- sustainability 
- bottom up 
- humility 
- innovation 
- egoism 
- exploitation 
- top-down 
- arrogance 
Sacred Values Secular Values 
Fig. 1 The value continuum 
For the same phenomenon, other terms have been used. Cunha (1988), for example, prefers 
to speak of the existentialist and the productivist paradigm, whereas Fernandes & Carvalho 
Tomás (2001) use the couple 'ecocentrism' and 'technocentrism'. From another philosophical 
perspective, secular values correspond to the male or yang view, sacred values, for their part, to 
the female or yin perspective. Whatever terminology we apply, they two extremes are comple-
mentary and represent extreme positions that are never fully attained; yet they have to be taken 
into consideration. Neither is good or bad, but imbalance in either direction can be detrimental: 
too much reliance on sacred values leads to stiffness, too much confidence in secular values re-
sults in restlessness and uncertainty. 
Throughout history, from the pre-Neolithic predator to the Neolithic cultivator and past the 
middle Ages, the predominant values have always oscillated between the two extremes (Fig. 2). 
Every innovation (the plough, bow and arrow, the wheel etc.) meant a shift towards secular val-
ues, but the impact of such early innovations on the ecosystem and on societies was negligible, 
given the limited number of people who applied them in daily life. In the Age of Enlightenment 
(since the 17th century), the philosophical basis for the natural sciences were laid, and Man be-
gan to dominate nature, a process that conducted him towards the Industrial Revolution with 
increasing negative impacts on the environment. Domination was reinforced by the technologi-
cal breakthrough of the 20th century and led to reckless exploitation. The pendulum swung right 
towards the secular values that came to govern human actions. The ecosystem was thus viewed 
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as a domain at the exclusive service of mankind, as possessing a simple use value: ecocentrism 
was replaced by technocentrism (Fernandes & Carvalho Tomás, 2001).  
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Fig. 2 Changing value systems in the relations between humans and the ecosystem 
A vertical line marks the dominating values: sacred values to the left, secular values to the right 
While it is no use criticizing the Enlightenment revolution ex post, it must nevertheless be 
pointed out that its way of thinking has radically changed human attitudes. Appropriation and 
exploitation became the prevailing traits in the European worldview. Individual actions were put 
over collective ones; reason triumphed over traditional authority, and through “the disengage-
ment of nature from a supernatural worldview” (Shea & Huff 1995, quoted in Withers & Liv-
ingstone 1999, p. 5), the position of Man within the Creation was reversed. The biblical saying 
“replenish the earth and subdue it” (Genesis 1/28) was taken too literally: to subdue was 
equalled to exploitation that usually results in destruction. While John Locke advocated that 
subduing nature is a means to avoid scarcity (Van Dieren 1995, p. 19), he did not deliver a 
passport to destruction: to subdue does not exclude management. 
Humans replaced supernatural elements in their worldview by rational ones. This process 
has been described by Lea (1994) who pointed out that since the Middle Ages, God was moved 
from His position in the Creation and gradually replaced by Man and, ultimately, by the new 
gods Science and Technology, who may eventually take control over the human race (Fig. 3). 
Gould (1999, p. 406) confirms this point when he says “We are in a European world where the 
God giving meaning is being displaced from the centre and being replaced by the human as the 
measure of all things, positing increasingly the way the world will be, positing even the god be-
ing displaced.” (Emphasis in the original). In other words, humanity plays god, and the ‘old 
God’ is given His (or Her) place just somewhere (or even nowhere).  
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Fig. 3 Man – God relationship (after Leimgruber 2000, p. 12, modified) 
Values influence our thinking, an activity that usually precedes decisions and actions. In the 
second half of the 20th century, we have acquired the tool of general systems theory that enables 
us to understand and foresee complicated processes, to avoid a dead end, and to beware of nega-
tive outcomes. Modern simulation techniques would be unthinkable without this instrument, 
which owes its potential to the human brain, by far the most elaborate of all living creatures. Its 
complexity with six layers (ten if we count the subdivision of layers 4 to 6) and two halves dis-
tinguishes us from the animal realm (Aubier 1992, p. 200) and is the basis for complicated re-
flections. Bourguignon & Koupernik (2001) emphasise this point: “Le cerveau humain, du fait 
de son extraordinaire richesse, est le seul cerveau de la série animale capable de concilier la 
répétition et le changement.“ (Thanks to its extraordinary richness, the human brain is the only 
one in the animal realm, which is capable of combining repetition and change). This particular-
ity enables us to think in different ways (Fig. 4): laterally by successively opening up new lines 
of thought, logically by proceeding along a strict ‘yes – no’ line, or naturally by allowing our 
thoughts to flow freely (Wood 1987, p. 290 ff.) However, it is important to think ‘organically’,
i.e. see the integration or mutual dependencies of individual lines of thought to understand sys-
temic processes.  
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Lateral thinking Logical thinking 
Start
Natural thinking ‘Organic‘ thinking 
Fig. 4 Modes of thinking (after Wood 1987, p. 291) 
It is a commonplace that we do not know how and what other people think. We should, 
however, respect the different ways of thinking. All our actions originate in thoughts, but the 
way we think is to a substantial amount influenced by the society and the culture we live in and 
the common value system. Every culture faces specific problems of survival, and the response 
to a particular natural event may vary from one group to another – even from one individual to 
another. This diversity of thinking is mirrored by the diversity of knowledge systems that are 
adapted to given social circumstances, and which can be applied to local and regional food sup-
port systems as well as to the management of local and regional ecosystems. This diversity, 
however, has been replaced by ‘monocultural’ thinking (Shiva 1993) which has spread over the 
globe as a consequence of European colonisation. This point must be stressed because during 
the era of colonization, European countries not only conquered territories overseas with popula-
tions to dominate and resources to exploit, they also diffused their own value systems and con-
sidered other peoples' cultures as inferior. This is what Gould means when he speaks of the 
‘European world’ (1999, p. 406). One of the ideas spread was that of use value attributed to a 
particular resource, a unilateral use from the perspective of European industry. This monocul-
ture of the mind is exemplified by the conviction that one given plant serves one single purpose 
only (a tree for timber or paper wood; Shiva 1993, p. 13) or by the erroneous assumption that 
Eucalyptus “is faster growing than all indigenous alternatives” (ibid., p. 31). Monocultural 
thinking wants to make a complicated world simple, tailored exclusively to specific ('western') 
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human needs. A tree, however, not only consists of wood but has also leaves which can serve 
for fodder and give shade to a plantation, and it holds an important position in a local ecosys-
tem, adding to its biodiversity (Fig. 5). It combines use values and non-use values. 
Tree
fuel
timber
shade
leaves
fodder
plantation
biodiversity 
nutrients
Fig. 5 Diversity in thinking 
The dynamic nature of the ecosystem 
Environmental change is a normal phenomenon because life is by its very nature dynamic. A 
static situation is the exception, and its duration is limited. When we study structures, we ob-
serve a momentary state in a steady process. As humans, however, we tend to feel uneasy about 
constant changes. We prefer a stable situation within which we can organize our lives peace-
fully without having to adapt to new circumstances all the time. Every law and regulation testi-
fies to this desire for stability: we want to be sure what happens in a given moment under cer-
tain circumstances, we want to control the situation at any moment. Unexpected events, how-
ever, do occur and force us to modify our rules according to the new conditions 
The natural environment is an ever-changing system, following its own rule of self-
sustainability – this is a commonplace. Humans (who have been transforming their living space 
in an intentional way for more than ten thousand years) have always tried to construct stable 
social conditions for themselves – this is another commonplace. But since the 17th century, we 
have gradually forgotten the first commonplace and have attempted to adapt the environment to 
the second: mankind longed for a stable nature to permit a stable (i.e. safe) way of human life. 
Nature had to be controlled; it had to obey human wishes and needs. To do so, technical means 
were developed to influence, check or repair certain types of changes (e.g. flood control, slopes 
stabilisation, afforestation, earthquake proof constructions etc.) in order to protect settlements 
and transportation routes. Inconspicupous at first, they increasingly resulted in artificial land-
scapes and disturbed the functioning of the ecosystem. Currently we assist expensive processes 
of landscape rehabilitation: watercourses are given natural banks,and hedges are replanted. 
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Large-scale afforestation programs in many countries put the trees back that have been felled 
but do not re-create the original forest ecosystems with their dynamic equilibria. "The result is 
often a simpler ecosystem in which genetic resources are only partially preserved." (Attfield 
1999, p. 84). The technical measures primarily fight the symptoms without going to the roots of 
the problem. 
The processes changing our environment broadly fall into three categories: 
1. Natural processes beyond human control (earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, long-term 
climate change, hurricanes), 
2. Natural processes as unintended consequences of human actions (soil erosion following 
forest clearing, desertification due to overgrazing, climate change due to the emission 
of greenhouse gases), 
3. Intentional transformations (flood control, dams, afforestation). 
We accept and promote man-made transformations of the environment (the third category) 
if they bring or enhance security, comfort, and welfare. Any failure can be repaired by technical 
improvements. We have to live with events of the first category because there is no way of 
avoiding them. It is possible to predict certain events to some degree – the locatios of the seis-
mic zones and of volcanoes on earth are known, and sophisticated models permit us to forecast 
the weather, but despite the advanced state of science, we shall never arrive at certainty. The 
true violence of the hurricane Lothar, for example, which struck parts of Europe on Boxing Day 
1999, could not be foreseen in time.  
The real difficulty lies with the second category because it is precisely here that humans 
can intervene and change themselves, and it is from this category that emerge the multiple 
threats to the environment, which may induce people to leave their homes. Resource use and 
research in the natural sciences look first and foremost towards the wishes and (real or imagi-
nary) needs of society. Satisfying demand is a practical task, based on research and resource 
use. While scientific results, application, and commercial success may turn up in a relatively 
short time, the unintended consequences of technical measures will appear much later. DDT and 
the FCHC, for example, have been applied successfully for many decades until their negative 
impacts became visible. 
The uncertainty about the dynamics of the ecosystem calls for the application of the precau-
tionary principle, particularly in decisions and actions on technology influencing directly or in-
directly the natural environment. This includes, e.g., the careful selection of settlement sites or 
transportation routes, taking into account not only present-day risk evaluations but also past 
events and local knowledge. Information is an important instrument to publicize precautionary 
measures, but we have to bear in mind that the public has not the same perception of a potential 
event as scientists. Our western society has gradually become accustomed to the possibilities, 
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quality and reliability of modern technology; we expect things to function in a certain way and 
can hardly imagine another scenario than the one we have in our minds. Research on the percep-
tion of flood hazard in the US as early as the 1950ies have shown that “increased spending on 
flood prevention … was actually paralleled by greater losses from flood damage, possibly be-
cause people modify their attitude to flood plain occupancy in the light of changing beliefs as to 
the power of available technology.” (Walmsley & Lewis 1984, p. 109). Too much confidence in 
technology may be as wrong as excessive scepticism about the efficiency of technical flood 
prevention methods. The inhabitants of the Beijiang region in rural northern Guangdong prov-
ince in China believe that floods are unavoidable and prefer to adapt themselves to the risk 
(Wongh & Zhao 2001). Only one in five rates flood prevention structures useful (ibid. p.197). In 
many instances, people flee from their home region struck by a natural catastrophe, but want to 
return home as quickly as possible. The attachment to their homes as well as to symbolic places 
(including cemeteries and tombs of ancestors) prevails over the fear of further events. This can 
be observed when earthquakes strike densely populated regions. In the Friuli region (northeast 
Italy), the population started to rebuild their houses after a first quake in May 1976; they were 
evacuated after the second earthquake in September of the same year, but the reconstruction was 
continued (Geipel 1989). In the case of the Kobe earthquake in 1995, it was obviously deemed 
impossible to relocate an entire city; the authorities promoted improved building technology in 
order to ensure a safe living space. – People also tend to forget past events, in particular if they 
lie several generations back. A severe flood hit the small town of Brig in Switzerland in 1993, 
but nobody had remembered that similar events had occurred in the centuries before, the last in 
1912. 
Applying a precautionary approach is a necessity for a society that has lost the intimate 
knowledge about the relations between human actions end the scope allowed by the ecosystem. 
All activities have significant impacts, and they should not be considered negligible unless 
proved to be so. The complex and highly dynamic ecosystem will never be perfectly under-
stood. As a consequence, scientific advice to management is always affected by uncertainty. 
Management decision processes in turn have their own uncertainties, and in the end the impacts 
on the system are difficult to predict accurately. The consequences of management errors thus 
may take a long time to be corrected (FAO 2000, chapter ‘Indicators of sustainable development 
and the precautionary approach in marine capture fisheries’, section ‘The precautionary ap-
proach’). What about political decisions? 
Politicians find themselves inside a complex network of obligations and interests, and they 
do not necessarily practise precaution. They tend to think in terms of electoral periods, want to 
stay in power, and try to avoid unpopular measures even if they were necessary. They may ac-
cept that nature has its own ways but want to apply the principle of market liberalism to the re-
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lationship Man – ecosystem. The reasoning is simple: if the cost for a specific good exceeds the 
price customers are prepared to pay, this good will no longer be demanded. This, however, 
would mean internalising environmental cost, something, which so far has hardly happened. In 
this way, nature could regulate itself according to the free-market rules. This, at least, is the 
simplistic view of the ardent defenders of unlimited human freedom. The idea of common re-
sponsibility remains outside their thinking. 
Changing human perspectives 
The human pressure on the ecosystem can be viewed from two angles, both based on the notion 
of ‘needs’ (Anderson 1996, p. 85 ff.), but following two diverging paths. First, the overall popu-
lation growth calls for more food, water, and other goods to satisfy the basic needs of an in-
creasing number of people. Countries with a heavy demographic pressure (countries in the 
'South') already now have severe problems of supply, and the future looks bleak for many. In-
creased demand puts additional stress on the ecosystem and favours its degradation. This fact 
alone may suffice to propel mass migration. Critical meteorological conditions such as droughts 
(Richter 2000) will aggravate the problem. Secondly, the increase of affluence in the 'North' 
continues to provoke new desires for consumer goods. The economy is invited to provide a 
steady flow of (seemingly) new and better products. People in the North demand unlimited ful-
filment of their wishes; otherwise they will run into what I should call the problem of 'social 
scarcity'1 . Human creativity for material goods is under a constant challenge, new resources 
have to be opened up, and the 'one-way-society' generates superfluous waste2.
It is a commonplace that this kind of exploitation will eventually overstretch the potential 
of the ecosystem, both as a provider of resources and as a sink for waste, and it will inevitably 
collapse at a certain moment in time. Its carrying capacity in the strict sense can only be tapped 
indefinitely if its limits are respected and its inertia or elasticity used sparingly (Fig. 6). The
consumption of the ecosystem by human demand can be seen as passing through three stages, of 
which the third need not arrive, if adequate measures are being taken at the moment demand 
passes from stage I into stage II or at the latest when it is being satisfied by the elasticity of the 
system. The three stages are: 
Stage I Demand varies within the carrying capacity of the natural system 
Stage II Demand and/or way of satisfying it pass beyond the threshold of sustainability. The 
inertia of the system guarantees satisfaction for a limited period 
Stage III Satisfaction of demand is reduced due to declining performance or collapse of the 
natural system. 
                                                          
1  Consumer goods are the mark of social prestige. To own more, better and the most up-to-date products 
is necessary to keep up with the neighbours. Social scarcity means the lack of these goods. 
2  Only a fraction of the resources used will eventually be transformed into a final product, and most of 
them will be thrown away immediately after their first use (von Weizsäcker et al. 1997, p. 19). 
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intensity 
Fig. 6 Demand and the ecosystem 
(Source: Hauser 1990, vol. I, p. 43) 
The model is not deterministic as the drawing might suggest. If the growth of demand can 
be kept inside the carrying capacity, there will be no permanent degradation, and sustainability 
can be guaranteed (Attfield 1999, p. 104). Under the prevailing secular value system, this is not 
so easy, and Hauser reminds that “long-term survival of mankind is only possible within a dy-
namic equilibrium, and in a dynamic equilibrium, growth can only be tolerated during a short 
period.” (1990, II, p. 584). His remark calls for zero growth – the nightmare of every share-
holder and company executive who view growth3 from a purely quantitative perspective.  
Unfortunately for humans, the ecosystem is very complex, and our needs vary considerably 
over space and time. We do not know where precisely its threshold lies, and we tend to go be-
yond the limits – a point made more than a generation ago by Meadows et al. (1972) and con-
firmed twenty years later (Meadows et al. 1992). His ignorance in this matter prevents Man 
from applying the precautionary principle consistently and considering restrictions, for example. 
Enhanced resource efficiency could help to solve many problems. What has been possible to 
some extent with energy after the oil shock of the 1970s should be carried further into other 
fields.
The basic problem has been recognized, and numerous counter movements have sprung up 
long before the Rio summit sounded the alarm bell. Top-down initiatives combining interven-
tions on ecological and development questions (by the Club of Rome, the Club of Lisbon, the 
South Commission etc.) go back into the 1960ies, but in the eyes of many, they seem to be of 
carrying capacity elasticity (inertia)
evolution of demand
I II I II III
time 
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little effect as they work too slowly. As a consequence, numerous bottom-up movements have 
emerged in many countries (Ekins 1992), initiating local actions in order to offer immediate re-
lief and to draw the attention of the general public to social and ecological distress. Bottom-up 
movements demand solidarity and hard work, often without remuneration. Their existence dem-
onstrates that a new way of thinking is making its way. It has been understood that “clean water 
and air, unpolluted soils, are not available ‘freely’ in nature once human beings have had a hand 
in economic development.” (Redclift 1995, p. 12), but that a personal sacrifice is required. Such 
measures go beyond technology and are often taken without political support. They may receive 
help from NGOs within the scope given them by the political class.  
Environmentally induced migration 
At this point it does make sense to briefly discuss the problem of ‘environmental migration'. 
This term itself is far from explicit and calls for clarification. Baechler noted a few years ago 
that the distinction between people who flee from natural disasters and those who migrate be-
cause of environmental degradation is fluctuating (1995, p. 74). It remains an open question if 
they prefer to migrate for good or if they see their movement as temporary, until a return is pos-
sible. Temporary migrations have been the rule rather than the exception in semi-arid regions 
where rainfall determined the agricultural potential, and in shifting cultivation regular displace-
ments were part of the system. The duration of migration depends on the type of environmental 
change which drives people away: the permanent flooding of a valley due to the construction of 
a dam is different from a flood due to a specific meteorological situation and from climatic 
variations whose temporal aspects are difficult to asses. 
It has been said above that environmental change is essentially the result of human deci-
sions and actions. Northern (European) thinking has contributed to the deterioration of living 
conditions in the ecological, economic, and social domain all over the globe, and the industrial-
ised countries have to assume their share of responsibility (Scheffran 1994, p. 23). These three 
domains are intimately connected: wars are fought over natural resources or over the dominance 
of an ideology, and they result in the destruction of the land and in poverty among the refugees 
from the war zones (e.g. Sudan, Vietnam; we could also recall the risks which persist to agricul-
ture and forestry in Northern France due to unexploded shells from the heavy battles in 1916 
during World War I; see Amat 1987, 1988); unsafe industrial plants threaten the populations 
living in their surrounding (Seveso, Bhopal), overexploitation leads to desertification (Goudie 
1990, p. 48 f.; Döös 1997; Richter 2000, p. 13), monocultural farming results in soil degradation 
and soil erosion, unconsidered deforestation disrupts regional ecosystems and subsequently 
                                                                                                                                                                         
3   True growth occurs when the rise of the economic performance lies above population increase within a 
given period.  
Wengen 2001 - 12 
Version 25.08.05 - 17:04 
promotes soil erosion – the list could be continued. In all such cases, the degradation of the en-
vironment acts as a push-factor for the populations concerned. Emigration may be the only pos-
sible way for survival.  
It is true that mass migrations have been caused by natural events beyond human control. 
Soil and climate variability – hence economic instability – were partly responsible for frequent 
nomadic incursions into China (Brauer, [p. 24] speaks of an “ecological discontinuity”) which 
sometimes resulted in lengthy occupation periods, and in the 20th century, repeated migration 
waves occurred in the Sahel region in Western Africa (Richter 2000), although migration in that 
region has a long tradition (Hammer 1999, pp. 256 ff.). Following an earthquake, emigration 
may be temporary only (such as in the case of the Friul; Geipel 1989), but also floods or 
droughts do not necessarily drive people away for good. Even if emigration for environmental 
reasons is a decision based on an external factor, it will often be looked at as a constraint that 
will not last forever. The wish to return home after the end of the threat may be stronger than 
the perceived risk to survival. 
The present-day long-range human modification of world climate, which can now be meas-
ured with some accuracy, however, may result in future migration flows that are likely to be 
irreversible. Coastal lands submerged by the rising sea level cannot be recovered unless one is 
prepared to construct coastal defences to protect the lands. The Dutch could afford to finance 
such massive constructions, Bangladesh, however, cannot. Once the ecological basis for sur-
vival is destroyed (i.e. the land is drowned or swept away, the soil is degraded or eroded), there 
is no way to return. 
The relations between environmental and human factors have been described by Döös 
(1997, p.43). He puts great emphasis on the human factor, represented by population, society 
(with economics and politics), and minority conflicts. Behind them, however, lies the value sys-
tem according to which a population evolves, organizes its economy and political system, and 
views minority groups. Civil war and international conflicts are also directly related to the three 
factors and the value system (Fig. 7). 
The emphasis on values is justified by the role they play in our life. Our actions vary ac-
cording to the values that guide us: exploitation or conservation, individual profit or common 
welfare, i.e. secular or sacred values. From the colonial epoch onwards, rationalist European 
thinking and secular values have been imposed on peoples of the South who, however, were not 
prepared to this and lacked the intellectual and material means to cope with the problems stem-
ming from this new value system. The North has exploited the South (e.g. by promoting mono-
cultural cash crops for the World market and repatriating the profits obtained); it is therefore at 
least partly responsible for the degradation of the environment and the mass movements occur-
ring from time to time. Since the industrialised world has become aware of the ecological trap 
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into which the World is about to fall, it wants to dictate the South certain ways of behaviour to 
save our planet – a very cynical attitude which has little to do with a true concern about the fu-
ture of the Earth but is rather a way to maintain its power over the South without manifesting 
the intention to do the same! Basically, however, it is not our task to tell other people what to 
do; we have contributed to the degradation of their environment without trying to understand 
their world view, now we shall give them a chance to solve the problems not according to our 
northern ideas but in combination with theirs: the diversity of thinking is offering alternatives 
(Shiva 1993; Zweifel 1995), not the technocratic northern dictates. 
Environmentally induced migration may have several origins. It may root directly in natural 
changes in the environment, or it may be economically motivated based on unintended conse-
quences of human interventions on the ecosystem. Depending on the intensity of impact and on 
the perceived duration of absence, a migration movement may be looked upon as a temporary or 
the final solution to the human distress, and the distance of migration will be related to this per-
ception.
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Fig. 7 Interconnections between factors influencing environmentally induced migration (modified after Döös 1997,p. 43) 
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Policy implications 
International mass migration has many political consequences, and the North is gradually be-
ginning to understand them. At present, no solutions to the expected flows have been found, and 
the laws have not yet been adapted to this new 'threat'. So far, migration has been dealt with 
from the perspective of the labour markets; laws and regulations sufficed to control the flows of 
immigrants. 
Environmentally induced migration, however, is a new phenomenon, and we are ill pre-
pared for it. The category of ‘ecological refugee’ does not exist in the political and legal vo-
cabulary, nor does that of the ‘economic refugee’. Refugees are defined according to the UN 
Convention as people persecuted for ethnic, ideological or political reasons. A new reality has 
been emerging since the 1980ies, and we shall have to live with it despite all efforts of the coun-
tries of the North to prevent these two new groups from being included in the refugee definition. 
This means rejecting our responsibility for the ecological and economic causes of such mass 
movements. 
Solutions have to be sought. Barring the borders of industrial countries is not the answer to 
the growing pressure on our boundaries. It makes the North even more attractive and results in 
clandestine immigration and trafficking with immeasurable consequences. Human tragedies are 
happening every day on the outer borders of the European Union, in particular in the Mediterra-
nean, but also in other parts of the World. This mass movement, whether ecologically, politi-
cally or economically motivated, is the reaction on the exportation of Northern values and the 
refusal of the North to take the problems of the South seriously. 
New approaches have to be evaluated. Preventing emigration instead of fighting off immi-
gration requires rethinking Northern attitudes in general and towards the South in particular. In 
addition, the cooperation of the elites in the countries of origin must be secured. Investments 
must be profitable for the population and the country as a whole, not for the industrial countries 
and the ruling class alone. Large-scale democratisation is needed, i.e. a redistribution of wealth 
and social equity – a change of attitude. The pendulum has to swing back from an excessive 
emphasis on secular values towards the sacred side. There are signs that this is happening, but 
the process has still to increase in force. Consumers of the North develop solidarity with pro-
ducers of the South, and the opposition to globalization (or, more precisely, global trade liberal-
ism) is increasing (Hoad 2001). Most opponents – those who demonstrate peacefully and those 
who silently disagree – are motivated by genuine worries about the future of our planet, both in 
ecological and in social terms. Politics ought to take these protests seriously and, instead of re-
pressing them, look at the positive core and take action accordingly. This, of course, might 
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prejudice the delicate links between political power and economic hegemony and endanger cor-
porate interests. Courage would be required for such a forward looking policy.  
Concluding remarks 
What is to be done to remedy such a dramatic situation? I should like to launch two reflections 
that may point ways we shall have to go in the future. They are to some extent related. 
1. In the film ‘Après la tempête’ (After the storm), the French philosopher Dominique Aubier 
discusses, among other things, the trees felled by the hurricane ‘Lothar’ in December 1999 
(Van Effenterre 2000). In a rather unconventional comment, she asserts that the storm had 
simply stopped the growth of the trees, and that after the passage of ‘Lothar’ new life will 
grow in the same forest. The trees are, according to her, not dead, they have simply been 
‘stopped’ in full life (“Nous avons un stop, ce n’est pas la mort que nous avons là, c’est de 
l’arrêt. Ils sont tous stoppés en pleine vie comme s’ils avaient fait un pas de trop.”). From 
this statement we can infer that to halt one particular process can be the source of a new and 
better process. To prevent inventions from becoming commercialised (among other things, 
she refers to biotechnology) may be obvious to a philosopher who takes a wide look at the 
phenomena in life but not ‘normal’ to the inventor or the economic interests behind. How-
ever, certain politicians and company managers should learn from philosophers and widen 
their outlooks as well. The same applies to science and technology – it may be better to stop 
before a road becomes a way of no return. This sounds like heresy, but the current success 
of organic farming illustrates how a new way is overcoming the deadlock of conventional 
monocultural farming.  
2. The World is an open ecosystem, functioning according to deterministic rules and receiving 
solar energy to keep it going. Open systems stand good chances of survival because of the 
constant energy input they receive. The global economy, on the other hand, is probabilistic 
and appears to function as a closed system. Its sole energy input is self-generated, and if it 
continues in this way, it will inevitably wear out and come to a standstill. Renewal out of it-
self is impossible, as the collapse of the State-planned Soviet economy demonstrated. The 
so-called ‘free market economy’ is theoretically open to external energy inputs, but mone-
tary profit as the sole fuel of an economy is no external energy. The protesters against glob-
alisation (who are themselves globalised and opposed to the neoliberal paradigm) remind us 
that a change is imperative. While Seattle 1999 has been “widely perceived as an ideologi-
cal turning point.” (Smith 2000, p. 2), most protesters offer no solution to the problems 
evoked, but they are an indicator of a widespread concern about the excessive liberalisation 
of trade and the growing global disparities.  
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Environmental change and potentially ensuing mass migration cannot be solved by technical 
measures alone but require a change in thinking and attitudes. Their driving forces lie with us, 
the human society, in particular with the industrialized world. Looking at the World's current 
state and in particular at a number of political leaders, I am rather pessimistic for the future, al-
though I am basically an optimist. We are reaping the fruits of worldwide colonisation, of the 
export of the European ways of thinking, of reckless exploitation of the Earth for the benefit of 
a few.
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